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Reforming Adult Felony Probation to Ease 
Prison Overcrowding:  An Overview of 
California S.B. 678 
Jessica Feinstein* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, California’s prison overcrowding crisis made 
national headlines.1  A panel of three federal judges ordered the 
state to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of design capacity 
within two years in order to conform with constitutional 
requirements.2  Faced with the threat of releasing as many as 
fifty thousand offenders into the community, lawmakers and 
state officials rushed to devise plans that would satisfy the 
federal mandate, while also preserving public safety.3 
Yet, the specter of tens of thousands of offenders living in the 
community is not a future scenario, but a present-day fact.  As of 
December 31, 2008, approximately 445,822 adults in California 
were under “community supervision,” serving the remainder of a 
state prison term on parole or having been directly sentenced to 
probation.4  Roughly three-quarters of adults serving sentences 
in the community5—or about three times the number of offenders 
in California prisons at any one time6—are probationers.  The 
large number of individuals on probation is directly tied to the 
state prison population: felony offenders who failed probation 
supervision account for about forty percent of all new felony 
 
* J.D. Stanford Law School, 2010; M. St. History of Art & Visual Culture, 
University of Oxford, 2007. 
 1 Solomon Moore, Court Panel Orders California to Reduce Prison Population by 
55,000 in 3 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, at A12. 
 2 Opinion and Order, at 130, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK 
JFM P (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009). 
 3 Solomon Moore, Federal Judges Order California Prisons to Reduce Inmate 
Population by a Quarter, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2009, at A10. 
 4 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, PROBATION AND 
PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2008, at 17 (2009) [hereinafter BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS], available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus08.pdf. 
 5 Id. at 19. 
 6 As of December 31, 2008, the California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation (CDCR) reported a total prison population of 164,919. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. 
& REHAB., MONTHLY REPORT OF POPULATION AS OF MIDNIGHT DECEMBER 31, 2008 (2009), 
available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_ 
Branch/Monthly/TPOP1A/TPOP1Ad0812.pdf. 
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prison admissions each year,7 or roughly ten percent of yearly 
total prison admissions.8 
The prison crisis, accompanied by a crippling prison budget,9 
an economic downturn, and an estimated $20 billion deficit,10 
forced the California Legislature, after years of neglect, to turn 
its attention to California’s adult probation population.11  This 
extraordinary political moment opened the door for the 2009 
passage of S.B. 678, the Community Corrections Performance 
Incentives Act (CCPIA),12 which provides stable funding for 
county probation departments to implement evidence-based 
community corrections programs.13 
This article provides a holistic examination of the CCPIA, 
including an overview of the current state of California’s 
dysfunctional adult probation system, the political maneuvering 
which led to the passage of S.B. 678, and the challenges facing its 
successful implementation.  In particular, California’s own failed 
reform efforts, comprehensive analyses of probation in California, 
and other states’ probation legislation provide insight into the 
inadequacies of California’s adult probation system and how the 
CCPIA seeks to address these inadequacies. 
Part I of this article discusses adult probation as it currently 
exists in California, including the demographics, governance 
structure, and funding apparatus.  Part II details California’s 
prior attempts to fix adult probation, best practices as they are 
currently recognized, as well as new legislation conforming to 
those best practices in Arizona and Kansas.  Part III explores the 
legislative history of California’s S.B. 678 and explicates the 
 
 7 MAC TAYLOR, CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, ACHIEVING BETTER OUTCOMES 
FOR ADULT PROBATION 20 (2009) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE], available 
at http://www.lao.ca.gov/2009/crim/Probation/probation_052909.pdf. 
 8 CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., EXPERT PANEL ON ADULT OFFENDER AND 
RECIDIVISM REDUCTION PROGRAMMING 24 tbl.3 (2007) [hereinafter EXPERT PANEL], 
available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/2007_Press_Releases/docs/ExpertPanelRpt.pdf.  
Total annual prison admissions include parole violators as well as new felony convictions 
from the courts. 
 9 The 2009–2010 CDCR Budget is approximately $8.2 billion, and has replaced 
California’s university system as the largest state expenditure. Joan Petersilia, A 
Retrospective View of Corrections Reform in the Schwarzenegger Administration, 22 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 148, 149 (2010). 
 10 Shane Goldmacher, State Lawmakers Pass Proposal to Cut Budget Deficit by $1.1 
Billion, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2010, 11:36 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/ 
03/state-senators-budget-deficit.html. 
 11 See Roger K. Warren, Probation Reform in California: Senate Bill 678, 22 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 186, 186 (2010). 
 12 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1228–1233.8 (2010). 
 13 See § 1230; ROGER K. WARREN, AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, PERFORMANCE 
INCENTIVE FUNDING: CALIFORNIA SB 678 (2010), available at http://www.alec.org/AM/ 
PDF/publicsafety&elections/warren.pdf. 
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provisions included in the new CCPIA.  Finally, Part IV looks at 
the next steps for the CCPIA, including a discussion of the 
logistics of how various counties are implementing the act, and 
potential challenges that the CCPIA faces going forward.  While 
the CCPIA could successfully realign the formerly adverse 
incentives that the decentralized probation system has created, 
implementation poses significant challenges for the translation of 
theory into practice.  Should implementation prove successful, 
the CCPIA will mark a significant shift in how California uses 
adult probation—from an under-resourced catch-all for repeat 
offenders, to a front-end partner in the justice system. 
I.  PROBATION IN CALIFORNIA 
In its current state, adult probation in California is a broken 
system.  The dismal condition of probation is not a new 
phenomenon.  For years, county probation departments have 
struggled with piecemeal funding and decentralized standards 
and resources.14  Reports cataloguing the shortcomings of the 
probation system—if in fact it can be called a “system” at all, 
since that implies unified structure and central management—
and calling for reform have appeared with some regularity since 
1990.15  These reports and a failed legislative attempt at reform 
in 1994 will be discussed in greater detail in Part III.  However, 
for a brief summary of the current quality of California’s 
probation services, it is enough to quote the 2003 Final Report of 
the Probation Services Task Force: “[T]he status quo in the 
probation system is not acceptable. . . .  [T]he probation structure 
as it exists today functions poorly on many levels.”16 
The rate of adult felony probationers in California who fail to 
successfully complete their probation terms is high.17  Most of 
these felony “probation failures” are then sent to state prison as a 
result of new felony convictions or violations of the terms of their 
probation.18  The Legislative Analyst’s Office reported in 2009 
that adult felony probationers are revoked to state prison at a 
statewide average rate of about 7.5%; revocation to prison is as 
high as 12–16% in some counties,19 and the overall level of 
 
 14 Warren, supra note 11, at 186–87. 
 15 Joan Petersilia, Influencing Public Policy: An Embedded Criminologist Reflects on 
California Prison Reform, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 335, 341 (2008). 
 16 PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 70 (2003), available at 
http://www2.courtinfo.ca.gov/probation/documents/new/fullreport.pdf [hereinafter PROB. 
SERV. TASK FORCE]. 
 17 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 19. 
 18 Id. at 20. 
 19 Id. at 30–31.  The Legislative Analyst’s Office revocation statistics are likely lower 
than the real statistics because they include only new admissions to state prison with a 
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revocation of adult probationers (to jail and prison) is likely even 
higher.  These probation failures are thus incredibly costly for 
the state.  California’s state prison system, the California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), estimates 
that each failed probationer sentenced to state prison will serve 
8.6 months there.20  With the estimated average annual cost of 
incarcerating a state prisoner at $49,000,21 each failed 
probationer revoked to prison costs California an average of 
$35,116. 
California’s high rate of probation failure and generally 
dysfunctional adult probation system may be traced to two 
primary problems.  First, and most significantly, a lack of stable 
and adequate funding for county probation departments creates 
overburdened caseloads for probation officers.22  This in turn 
contributes to a low level of supervision for many serious 
offenders as well as a lack of programming, such as treatment 
and job training, which can help offenders successfully complete 
their probation terms.23  Inadequate funding also creates adverse 
incentives for probation departments and courts to keep 
probationers in the community rather than send them to state 
prison.24  Second, California’s decentralized probation system 
leads to a dearth of unified standards and goals for probation 
departments to follow.25  As a result, some probation 
departments in California have fallen behind the curve in regard 
to best practices.26 
A. California’s Adult Probation Population 
The challenges facing California’s probation departments are 
rooted in the population and composition of probationers 
themselves.  Probation is the most frequently imposed form of 
criminal sentence in California, and is not limited to the least 
serious offenders.27  Estimates of the state’s adult probation 
 
probation revocation flag on their record, and may not include probationers who had their 
probation terminated prior to being sent to state prison. Id.  Probation revocation 
statistics from the California Department of Justice’s Criminal Justice Statistics Center 
indicate higher levels of felony probation revocation, although many of these revocations 
may be to county jail rather than prison. CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS CENTER, ADULT PROBATION AND LOCAL ADULT SUPERVISION (2008), available 
at http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats?prof08/00/7.htm.  Until there are better data reporting 
systems in place, the true rates of revocation will remain unknown. 
 20 EXPERT PANEL, supra note 8. 
 21 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 19. 
 22 Id. at 17. 
 23 Id. at 19. 
 24 Id. 
 25 See generally PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16. 
 26 Id. 
 27 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 4, at 1. 
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population range from roughly 325,00028 to 350,000.29  This 
places California as third, after Texas and Georgia, for the 
highest number of adult probationers in the United States.30  The 
majority of these probationers are felony offenders.  Roughly 
three-quarters of adult probationers in California,31 or 270,000 
adults,32 are felony convicts.  Mirroring national data, 
probationers are overwhelmingly sentenced for drug and 
property offenses.  In 2007, forty-one percent of adult 
probationers in California were serving sentences for drug 
crimes, and twenty-three percent for property crimes.33  Although 
data regarding the criminogenic makeup of this population is 
scant, national studies indicate that probationers have high rates 
of substance abuse, mental illness, and unemployment—all 
factors which correlate to criminal activity.34 
In addition to a large and needy population, California’s 
probation departments have struggled to keep pace with the 
changing demographics of probationers.  Over the past fifteen 
years, the United States has experienced a rapid growth in the 
population of adults on probation,35 and California is no 
exception.36  From 1991 to 1999, the state’s total adult probation 
population increased seven percent;37 from 1997 to 2007 it 
increased fifteen percent.38  The number of new probation 
sentences entered each year more than doubled over the last 
decade, from 15,788 in 1999 to 35,684 in 2008.39  Significantly, 
 
 28 Id. at 19 (noting statistics compiled for Dec. 31, 2008). 
 29 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 3 (detailing 2007 data). 
 30 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 4, at 18–19. 
 31 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 8–9. 
 32 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1228(a) (2010) (finding that “in 2007, nearly 270,000 
felony offenders were subject to probation supervision in California’s communities”). 
 33 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 9. 
 34 See, e.g., PAULA M. DITTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH AND 
TREATMENT OF INMATES AND PROBATIONERS (1999), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf.mhtip.pdf; LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 9. 
 35 By the end of 1995, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported a probation 
population of a little over three million. Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, 22 
CRIME & JUST. 149, 149–50 (1997).  By the end of 2008, that number had increased by 
over a million to 4,270,917. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 4, at 1. 
 36 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 8.  The Bureau of Justice 
Statistics reports substantial decline in California’s overall probation population in 2008.  
However, this one-time decrease does not undermine the massive growth of the state’s 
probation population over a fifteen year period.  Nor is it clear what caused the decrease.  
Unsatisfactory probation exits—failure to complete probation and subsequent revocation 
to prison—might account for a portion of the decline; a decrease in misdemeanor 
probation is another possibility. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 37 PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 3. 
 38 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 8. 
 39 CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR, FINAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT, PROSECUTION, AND COURT DISPOSITION OF ADULT FELONY ARRESTS BY 
TYPE OF DISPOSITION STATEWIDE (2008), available at http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/ 
prof08/00/6.htm.  The annual number of new split sentences including probation 
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this increase in the number of adult probationers includes a shift 
in the underlying offenses from less serious to more serious.40  In 
fact, the number of misdemeanor probationers decreased by 
fifteen percent over the last decade.41  The rise in the total 
probation population is thus due to a two-decade-long increase in 
the number of felony probationers.  In 1996, the California 
Research Bureau reported an increasing backlog of sentenced 
felons resulting in an increase in probation referrals.42  This 
phenomenon is born out in the data: from 1990 to 1999, the 
number of felony probationers nearly doubled, from 130,000 to 
245,000,43 and then grew by approximately 50,000 more over the 
next ten years.44  Thus, not only are probation departments 
dealing with a significantly larger population than they were ten 
or twenty years ago, but also a more risky population requiring 
more supervision.  This “clearly has placed different and more 
intensive service demands on probation departments.”45 
Unfortunately, probation departments have not been able to 
keep pace.  The California Legislative Analyst’s Office reports 
that the rate at which California’s probationers successfully 
complete their probation terms is lower than the national 
average by ten percent.46  According to the U.S. Department of 
Justice, in 2008, of the 199,528 “exit” from probation in 
California, only 87,246 were “completions.”47  This means that 
less than half of adults removed from probation successfully 
completed their terms, while the rest lost probation status due to 
failure.  A probationer “fails” probation when he has his 
probation status revoked due to a technical violation, like failing 
a drug test, or he is convicted for a new crime.48  Of those who fail 
 
fluctuated from year to year between 1999 and 2008, but maintained a rough average of 
about 128,000.  Combining split sentences and pure probation sentences, the annual 
number of new probation sentences was 140,705 in 1999 and 164,416 in 2008. Id. 
 40 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 8. 
 41 Id. 
 42 MARCUS NIETO, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, THE CHANGING ROLE OF PROBATION IN 
CALIFORNIA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (1996), http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/96/06/ 
96006.pdf [hereinafter NIETO, THE CHANGING ROLE OF PROBATION]. 
 43 PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 3. 
 44 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 8. 
 45 PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 3. 
 46 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 20.  Indeed, as early as 1994, 
California’s failure rate diverged from the national average.  The California Research 
Bureau reported that one-in-seven adult probationers in California had his or her 
probation revoked, in comparison with a national average of one-in-ten. NIETO, THE 
CHANGING ROLE OF PROBATION, supra note 42, at 8. 
 47 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 4, at 23. 
 48 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2(a) (2010). 
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each year, a significant portion—somewhere from 14,53249 to an 
upward estimate of 20,00050—winds up in state prison. 
B. Structure, Governance, and Practices 
Despite the size and complexity of California’s probation 
population, there is little centralized state oversight.  The 
general statute governing probation in California is Penal Code 
section1203, which defines probation as “the suspension of the 
imposition or execution of a sentence and the order of conditional 
and revocable release in the community under supervision of a 
probation officer.”51  Other than this provision, there exists 
relatively scant statutory language detailing the structure or 
governance of probation departments, leaving counties to adopt 
most of their own practices, unhindered by state oversight.52 
California’s placement of primary responsibility for 
probation in the hands of counties, rather than the state, is 
unique.  California is the “only state in the nation to follow a 
strictly local operational model” for probation.53  The state has 
fifty-eight independent probation departments, one for each of 
the fifty-eight counties.54  In each county, one Chief Probation 
Officer oversees and supervises the department, and appoints 
deputy probation officers and other staff.55  In most counties, the 
Chief Probation Officer is in turn appointed by the superior 
court,56 and the local executive branch controls the management 
and finances of probation.57 
Probation departments perform a diverse array of roles for 
the community.  Probation not only “supervises” probationers—a 
task which itself includes varying responsibilities, from support 
to drug testing to enforcement—but also refers probationers to 
 
 49 EXPERT PANEL, supra note 8, at 143 (reporting 2006 data). 
 50 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1228(b) (2010) (reporting 2007 data). 
 51 § 1203(a). 
 52 The appointment process for chief probation officers is governed by CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1203.5 and § 1203.6, and CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 225, § 270 and § 271 
(West 2008); however, even this process varies widely among counties. PROB. SERV. TASK 
FORCE, supra note 16, at 40–41.  PENAL CODE § 1203.71 grants probation officers the 
powers of a peace officer with regard to probationers under their supervision, and 
§ 1203.73 grants probation officers necessary expense allowances from the county’s funds.  
PENAL CODE § 1203 et seq. sets the basic requirements of probation, including pre-
sentence reports and reporting of probation violations. 
 53 PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 61. 
 54 See State Juvenile Justice Profiles: California, NCJJ, http://70.89.227.250:8080/ 
stateprofiles/profiles/CA06.asp?state=%2Fstateprofiles%2Fprofiles%2FCA06.asp&topic= 
(last updated Feb. 4, 2008). 
 55 PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 40. 
 56 In several major population centers, including Los Angeles and San Diego, the 
CPO is appointed by the local board of supervisors rather than the court. Id. 
 57 Id. at 61. 
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programs, investigates crimes, oversees payment of court fines, 
and manages custody facilities and electronic monitoring 
systems.58  Probation thus assumes the difficult but important 
task of “link[ing] the system’s many diverse stakeholders, 
including law enforcement; the courts; prosecutors; defense 
attorneys; community-based organizations; mental health, drug 
and alcohol, and other services providers; the community; the 
victim; and the probationer.”59  The multitude of probation’s roles 
and partnerships, combined with the decentralization of 
probation in California and the diverse populations in counties, 
multiplies inconsistencies among probation departments as to 
procedures used and programs available. 
As a result, while some probation departments proceed 
largely in keeping with current best practices, others are far 
behind.60  The California Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO), after 
conducting a study of thirty-one counties, noted that “many 
probation departments do not follow all of the best probation 
practices identified in research.”61  For example, the LAO found 
that only eighty percent of surveyed counties use an evidence-
based risk and needs assessment to evaluate at least some 
segments of probationers.62  In addition, risk/needs assessments 
are not widely used among the counties to make sentencing 
recommendations in pre-sentence reports or in the process of 
prioritizing which probationers ought to receive intensive 
rehabilitation.63  Even assuming departments identify the 
probationers best positioned to benefit from rehabilitation, some 
counties lack rehabilitation programs that are open to 
probationers, while other counties’ rehabilitation programs 
“suffer from having limited capacity, few available locations, and 
questionable quality.”64  Finally, evaluating the efficacy of 
probation departments’ programs becomes challenging or 
impossible due to varied data tracking systems.  While several 
counties, such as San Francisco, have begun to use electronic 
systems to track data such as probation revocation rates,65 other 
 
 58 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 7–8; PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, 
supra note 16, at 49–54. 
 59 PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 1. 
 60 See LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 16 (finding that “the absence 
of a stable funding source for adult probation, and the lack of fiscal incentives to promote 
the best outcomes for public safety or efficiency, constitute major barriers to the 
promotion of successful probation practices” in California). 
 61 Id. at 5, 16. 
 62 Id. at 17. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Interview with Wendy Still, Chief Adult Probation Officer, City and County of San 
Francisco (April 28, 2010). 
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counties still rely on paper,66 making compilations of data 
impossible to create or evaluate.67  Many probation departments 
surveyed could not inform the LAO of how many probationers 
were participating in rehabilitation programs; and less than half 
of the responding counties were able to report the number of 
probation violations in a year.68 
The only factor most counties have in common is the 
excessive caseloads adult-probation officers juggle.69  The rising 
numbers of probationers70 and lack of funding71 directly 
contribute to this phenomenon.  For California’s estimated 
270,000 adult probationers, there are only about 3,000 sworn 
adult probation officers supervising them.72  The American 
Probation and Parole Association recommends fifty cases per 
officer and twenty cases for specialized caseloads.73  While these 
targets are idealistic, they are not realistic because caseloads in 
California far exceed that—each officer oversees an average of 
one hundred to two hundred cases, with specialized caseloads 
averaging around seventy.74 
High caseloads translate to less supervision for adult 
probationers, particularly those not assigned to special oversight.  
Most departments have “banked” caseloads, which receive little 
or virtually no supervision.75  According to the Chief Probation 
Officers of California (CPOC), approximately fifty-two percent of 
all probationers in California are on banked caseloads.76  The low 
 
 66 Telephone interview with Karen Pank, Executive Director, Chief Probation 
Officers of California (May 5, 2010).  See also LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 
7, at 18–19 (“Although many departments indicated that they would like to be able to 
track the above data, they currently lack the information technology systems that would 
be needed to do so.”). 
 67 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 18 (“[O]ur survey found that a 
majority of probation departments do not track the type of performance or outcome data 
that is necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of probation activities and programs.”). 
 68 Id. 
 69 PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 47. 
 70 See supra Part I.A. 
 71 See infra Part I.C. 
 72 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 9. 
 73 Id. at 15, 17–18. 
 74 Id. at 18.  The trend of large caseloads and “banking” probationers had already 
begun in 1996: 
[C]ounty probation officials are managing larger adult offender caseloads with 
fewer resources, often resulting in little or no supervision . . . .  Probation 
departments are increasingly placing sentenced offenders into large ‘banked’ 
caseloads (a new form of unsupervised probation) with a statewide average 
ratio of 629 offenders per probation officer. 
NIETO, THE CHANGING ROLE OF PROBATION, supra note 42. 
 75 PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 47. 
 76 CHIEF PROB. OFFICERS OF CALIFORNIA, ADULT PROBATION SERVICES AND THE 
NEED TO INCREASE PUBLIC SAFETY, ACCOUNTABILITY, COMPETENCY DEVELOPMENT AND 
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level of supervision for banked cases results in a problematic 
pattern: a probationer will build up repeated violations without 
sanctions, and will escalate his criminal behavior until he 
reaches a tipping point where a violation will result in a jail or 
prison term.77  CPOC explains that banked caseloads mean 
“there is little opportunity to intervene in the offenders[’] course 
of current criminal behavior.”78  Given that experts acknowledge 
that recidivism rates are high for felony probationers with 
minimal supervision,79 it is unsurprising that California’s failure 
rate is so high. 
C. Funding and Adverse Incentives 
Lack of adequate funds for adult probation is the primary 
cause of California’s probation woes.  Probation departments “do 
not enjoy a stable, reliable funding base,”80 and instead subsist 
on a “patchwork” financial structure that leaves adult probation 
services badly under-resourced.81  Compared with the money 
spent on prison, and even parole—both of which are state-run—
funds devoted to probation are meager at best.  It costs the state 
about $1,250 per year to maintain an offender on probation, 
three times that amount—$4,500 per year—to maintain an 
offender on parole, and  forty times that amount to incarcerate a 
prisoner.82 
As with management, the funding model for probation is 
local, and therein lies a portion of the problem.  Prior to the 
implementation of S.B. 678 in 2009, counties supplied two-thirds 
of probation funding; one-quarter of funding came from the state; 
and departments obtained the rest of their budget from federal 
grants and various court fees.83  California is once more an 
outlier in this respect—only one other state in the nation relies 
on local government as its primary source of funding for 
probation.84 
Although in 2009 California supplied one-quarter of its 
probation funds, it is important to emphasize that prior to the 
 
COST EFFECTIVENESS (2008) [hereinafter CHIEF PROB. OFFICERS OF CALIFORNIA], 
available at http://67.199.72.34/php/Information/Papers/papers.php. 
 77 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 18. 
 78 CHIEF PROB. OFFICERS OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 76. 
 79 Petersilia, Probation in the United States, supra note 35, at 181. 
 80 PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 43 
 81 Id. at 6. 
 82 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 19. 
 83 Id. at 12. 
 84 LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, SOLVING CALIFORNIA’S CORRECTIONS CRISIS 29 (2007) 
[hereinafter LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N], available at www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/185/ 
Report185.pdf. 
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passage of S.B. 678, the state provided no stable, ongoing funding 
for adult probation services.85  Proposition 172, a half-cent 
statewide sales tax for local public safety departments, 
contributes some funds for probation; and in 2007 and 2008, the 
state also gave $10 million in one-time grants to improve 
probation supervision and services for adults ages eighteen to 
twenty-five.86  But other than these one-time grants, most state 
money goes to juvenile probation programs.  In the mid-1990s, 
the Juvenile Crime Enforcement and Accountability Challenge 
Grant Program and the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act 
began funneling state resources to those under age eighteen.87  
This resulted in a “somewhat overbalanced emphasis on juvenile 
services,” meaning that “the limited number of remaining staff 
and resources is often sorely insufficient to properly supervise 
the adult probation population.”88  Insufficient numbers of 
probation officers overseeing adults, lack of programs and 
resources availability, large banked caseloads, and low 
supervision directly follow from lack of funds.89 
This dearth of funds for adult probation, in conjunction with 
inadequate supervision and resources, creates an incentive 
structure adverse to keeping probationers in the community.  
Probation officers are incentivized to recommend incarceration 
rather than probation since the state must then bear the 
financial burden of that offender; moreover, sending a 
probationer to prison is one less case for their already 
overburdened loads.90  In addition, judges know there is a lack of 
supervision of and resources available to the felony offenders 
they might otherwise sentence to probation.91  Why keep a felony 
offender in the community with little oversight or opportunity 
when sending the offender to prison at least incapacitates him 
from criminal activity on someone else’s dime?  Former 
Sacramento Superior Court Judge Roger K. Warren explained 
that “‘the principal reason . . . judges are sentencing too many 
non-violent offenders to prison is the absence of effective 
community corrections programs providing intermediate 
 
 85 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 12. 
 86 Id. 
 87 PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 44; LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, 
supra note 7, at 12.  See also Telephone interview with Jerry Powers, Legislative Chair, 
Chief Probation Officers of California and Stanislaus County Chief Probation Officer 
(Apr. 29, 2010) (stating that, for the past fifteen years, there has been a fear that juvenile 
crime was going to have a huge spike, and the state provided counties with funding so 
they “could work from a preventative perspective”). 
 88 PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 44. 
 89 Id. at 6. 
 90 See LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 3. 
 91 LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, supra note 84, at 26. 
Do Not Delete 3/16/2011 4:54 PM 
386 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 14:375 
punishments and necessary and appropriate treatment and 
rehabilitation services . . . .’”92  Probation departments, law 
enforcement, and courts worry about the headlines that could 
result from an unsupervised criminal on the streets.93  And, 
where resources are scarce and passing the buck is easy to do, 
many county actors will choose to shift the burden to the state.  
The Little Hoover Commission concluded that, as a result of 
these adverse incentives, “the State squanders its most expensive 
resource on low-level offenders who could be more effectively 
supervised by local authorities.”94 
II.  ATTEMPTS TO FIX PROBATION IN CALIFORNIA AND ELSEWHERE 
The problems with adult probation in California have been 
apparent to those familiar with the situation for at least two 
decades.  S.B. 678 is only the latest attempt to fix adult 
probation.  To properly understand the origins of the new law 
and the potential challenges facing its implementation, it is 
necessary to survey the various reform efforts and failed projects 
that preceded it.  S.B. 678 builds upon experience gleaned over 
the years from California’s own failed laws, the accumulation of 
knowledge regarding criminogenic factors and best practices, 
several expert reports, and legislative experiments in other 
states. 
A. California’s Failed Probation Legislation 
The California Legislature enacted the first probation laws 
in 1903.95  However, the first major legislative attempt to 
substantively impact county probation practices was the 
California Probation Subsidy Act of 1965.96  The Probation 
Subsidy Act was an incentive-based funding provision, the basic 
structure of which has much in common with S.B. 678.97  The 
Probation Subsidy Act provided counties up to $4,000 for each 
adult or juvenile offender supervised in the community, rather 
than sent to prison.98  The state provided counties with the 
subsidies based on probation departments’ improvement over 
 
 92 Id. 
 93 See, e.g., Adam Foxman, Proposed Prison Budget Cuts Worry Local Law Enforcers, 
VENTURA COUNTY STAR (Feb. 1, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.vcstar.com/news/2008/feb/ 
01/proposed-prison-budget-cuts-worry-local-law/. 
 94 LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, supra note 84, at 27. 
 95 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 et seq. (West 2004). 
 96 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 14. 
 97 MARCUS NIETO, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, COMMUNITY CORRECTION PUNISHMENTS: 
AN ALTERNATIVE TO INCARCERATION FOR NONVIOLENT OFFENDERS (1996) [hereinafer 
NIETO, COMMUNITY CORRECTION PUNISHMENTS], available at http://www.library.ca.gov/ 
crb/96/08/index.html. 
 98 Id. 
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historical commitment levels,99 thus incentivizing counties to 
maintain probationers in the community and lower their 
revocation rates.  Proponents of the Subsidy Act optimistically 
argued that: “[T]he state payment is sufficient to provide 
excellent supervisory and ancillary programs for three or four 
times as many persons as were not committed. . . .  In fact, the 
program should increase public protection through prevention of 
delinquency and reduction of repeated criminality.”100 
Especially in its early years, the Subsidy Act lived up to 
these expectations, diverting more than 45,000 offenders from 
state institutions to local probation programs.101  However, 
various factors contributed to the Legislature’s eventual decision 
to cease the subsidies.  First, although the Subsidy Act provided 
counties with more funding, most counties did not implement 
new services for offenders, such as halfway houses and day 
service centers.102  Second, the Act’s subsidies did not keep pace 
with the rate of inflation, undermining its efficacy at enticing 
counties to supervise offenders.103  And third, the Legislature 
came to consider the program too costly.104  As nationwide 
sensibilities shifted from rehabilitation to incapacitation, 
California’s move to a determinate sentencing scheme as well as 
the passage of tough on crime laws multiplied the number of 
offenders and the cost of prisons.105  Ending the subsidies 
immediately saved money for the state, although in the long term 
it might have proven more cost effective to fix the Subsidy Act 
rather than to scrap it.106  As a result, in 1978 the Legislature 
replaced the Probation Subsidy Act with the County Justice 
System Subvention Program, which provided counties with 
grants to support local justice programs.107  Later, the 
Subvention Program became a block grant with few 
requirements for grantees, and thus had little impact on prison 
commitments.108  By 1992, the Subvention Program represented 
only 7.5% of county probation expenditures statewide.109 
 
 99 Id. 
 100 STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., STATE/COUNTY CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PARTNERSHIPS IN CALIFORNIA: AN ABBREVIATED HISTORY 2 (2007) [hereinafter STANFORD 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR.], available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/report_ 
detail.aspx?id=32980. 
 101 NIETO, COMMUNITY CORRECTION PUNISHMENTS, supra note 97. 
 102 Id. 
 103 STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., supra note 100. 
 104 Id. 
 105 NIETO, COMMUNITY CORRECTION PUNISHMENTS, supra note 97. 
 106 STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., supra note 100. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 2–3.  “The County Justice Subvention Program still exists, see Cal. Welf. & 
Inst. Code § 1805 et seq., but deals only with probation services for juveniles.” Id. at 3. 
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Legislators enacted the second major attempt to impact 
probation in the mid-1990s as part of a trend of states enacting 
“community corrections acts.”110  These diverse acts all created 
“mechanisms by which state funds [were] granted to local 
governments and community agencies to encourage local 
sanctions in lieu of prison or jail.”111  Already in the late 1980s, a 
population crunch threatened California state prisons.112  In 
1990, the California Blue Ribbon Commission on Inmate 
Population Management recommended adopting a community 
corrections act to expand community-based intermediate 
sanctions.113  As a result, the Legislature passed the Community-
Based Punishment Act of 1994.114  The Community Based 
Punishment Act would establish a “partnership between the 
state and local government” to expand probation in an effort to 
ease prison overcrowding.115  As recommended, the Community 
Based Punishment Act encouraged counties to develop 
“intermediate sanctions” such as short-term jail stays, boot camp, 
home detention and electronic monitoring, community service, 
drug testing, rehabilitation, and job training.116  The Legislature 
recognized that probation programs required a “consistent, 
reliable, and separate funding source;” and it designated the 
California Board of Corrections to oversee the approval of county 
corrections plans and the annual doling out of funds.117 
Those funds never materialized.  The Achilles heel of the 
Community Based Punishment Act was not its goals or even its 
basic structure, but the total lack of long-term guaranteed 
funding or startup moneys.  Implementation was “contingent 
upon the availability of funding” from the state budget, federal 
funds, private grants, and “[o]ther sources as may be identified 
as suitable . . . .”118  The Community Based Punishment Act 
comically instructed the Board of Corrections to “seek startup 
funding . . . from public and private sources commencing as soon 
as practicable.”119  In 1995, the State Legislature allocated $2 
million to the Board of Corrections to fund county planning 
grants.120  This paltry sum was never replicated.  Needless to say, 
 
 110 See NIETO, COMMUNITY CORRECTION PUNISHMENTS, supra note 97. 
 111 Id. 
 112 LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, supra note 84, at 17. 
 113 Id. at 28. 
 114 CAL. PENAL CODE § 8050 et seq. (West 2000). 
 115 § 8051 (providing the “Legislative Findings”). 
 116 § 8052(e). 
 117 §§ 8051(f), 8061. 
 118 § 8090. 
 119 § 8092. 
 120 NIETO, THE CHANGING ROLE OF PROBATION, supra note 42, at 12. 
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the Community Based Punishment Act was a total failure as a 
result of these vague financial directives.121 
Following the 1994 act, there were no further legislative 
initiatives to fix adult probation until the state prison crisis came 
to a head in the late 2000s.122  But, the 1965 Probation Subsidy 
Act and the 1994 Community Based Punishment Act are still 
significant in that they communicate important lessons 
regarding implementation of reforms.  First, the Probation 
Subsidy Act’s initial success proves that state funds for county 
probation, if properly structured, can incentivize counties to 
supervise offenders in the community.  Second, successful 
implementation of a probation reform act requires a guaranteed 
and steady source of funding—both start-up and long-term.  
Third, once programs are implemented, the Legislature ought to 
make periodic evaluations of the programs and formulate 
adjustments as necessary.123  If the Legislature had adjusted the 
Probation Subsidy Act to account for inflation, the Subsidy Act 
might have proven to be more successful in the long-term.  And 
fourth, in a partnership between state and local authorities, each 
party must try to require accountability of the other.  For 
example, California ought to have required probation 
departments to implement new programs with subsidies from the 
1965 Act.  Relations between state and locals are notoriously 
difficult in California, and public safety collaborations tend to be 
strained.124  Mutual accountability is necessary for such 
collaborations to work.125 
B. Best Practices and Recommendations 
In the thirty or so years since California abandoned the 
Probation Subsidy Act, criminologists have made major advances 
in understanding what factors tend to impact offenders’ rates of 
recidivism, and what programs and sentencing structures are 
best able to reduce the risk of re-offense.  A body of “best 
practices” for community punishment and other forms of 
corrections has gradually emerged and is only now gaining 
 
 121 See LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, supra note 84, at 28. 
 122 Community Corrections Performance Incentives Act of 2009, CAL. PENAL CODE 
§§ 1228–1233.8 (2010). 
 123 In fact, the CBPA did provide for an annual progress report to the Legislature, but 
only on request. See § 8061(j). 
 124 STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., supra note 100, at 1. 
 125 See, e.g., Kristina Smock, Building Effective Partnerships: The Process and 
Structure of Collaboration, SHELTERFORCE ONLINE, May–June 1999, http://www.nhi.org/ 
online/issues/105/smock.html (arguing that, “[w]ithout enforceable rules of interaction 
[including mutual accountability], organizational partnerships often take the form of loose 
networks than functional collaborations[,]” and can sometimes cause “organizations [to 
be] unwilling to fully commit to potentially productive partnerships . . . .”). 
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headway in policy.  Significantly, this research shows that 
behavior change and rehabilitation can be successful when 
implemented properly for the right subsection of offenders.126 
Briefly, best practices include: (1) a combination of 
surveillance and treatment for probationers, rather than one or 
the other alone;127 (2) the use of evidence-based practices risk and 
needs assessment tools;128 (3) swift, certain, and proportionate 
punishment for all probation violations, with a concomitant 
range of graduated sanctions129 and positive incentives for 
offenders;130 and (4) community coordination and cooperation.131  
Over the last decade, various statewide studies and reports have 
recommended reforms for California’s probation system, 
including some of these practices. 
In 2000, California’s Administrative Office of the Courts 
appointed a Probation Services Task Force to perform a 
 
 126 See, e.g., MATTHEW T. DEMICHELE, AM. PROB. & PAROLE ASS’N, PROBATION AND 
PAROLE’S GROWING CASELOADS AND WORKLOAD ALLOCATION: STRATEGIES FOR 
MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 12 (2007), available at http://www.appa-net.org/eweb/ 
docs/appa/pubs/SMDM.pdf (“The research evidence in favor of offender behavior change as 
the most effective strategy to enhance public safety is impressive and voluminous.”) 
(citing various studies). 
 127 Criminologists have found that in programs where offenders receive a combination 
of surveillance and relevant treatment or “prosocial activities” such as education and 
employment programs, recidivism was reduced by twenty to thirty percent. See, e.g., Joan 
Petersilia, A Decade of Experimenting with Intermediate Sanctions: What Have We 
Learned? CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q., Summer 1999, at 19, 23; Petersilia, Probation in the 
United States, supra note 35, at 186.  See also DEMICHELE, supra note 126, at 8, 11–14 
(recommending an “integrated approach of surveillance, treatment, and enforcement,” 
and arguing that “the justice system goals of punishment and rehabilitation can 
effectively co-exist if carefully managed and thoroughly understood”). 
 128 CRIME & JUSTICE INST. & NAT’L INST. OF CORR., IMPLEMENTING EVIDENCE-BASED 
POLICY AND PRACTICE IN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS ix (2d ed. 2009) (“Evidence-based 
practice (EBP) is the objective, balanced, and responsible use of current research and the 
best available data to guide policy and practice decisions, such that outcomes for 
consumers are improved . . . . [E]vidence-based practice focuses on approaches 
demonstrated to be effective through empirical research rather than through anecdote or 
professional experience alone.”).  See also PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 81; 
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 13; DEMICHELE, supra note 126, at 8, 10, 
21, 30 (recommending risk/needs actuarial tools). 
 129 See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 
1, 8 (2006); PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 8. 
 130 See, e.g., COLORADO DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, EVIDENCE BASED CORRECTIONAL 
PRACTICES 5 (2007), available at www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0805SENTENCERES10.pdf 
(“Researchers have found that optimal behavior change results when the ratio of 
reinforcements is four positive to every negative reinforcement.”). 
 131 Given probation’s position as the “link” between justice system actors, successful 
collaboration with key stakeholders, such as police and service providers, is crucial to the 
success of community corrections programs. See, e.g., Petersilia, A Decade of 
Experimenting with Intermediate Sanctions: What Have We Learned?, supra note 127, at 
27 (“Workable, long-term solutions must come from the community and be embraced and 
actively supported by the community.”);; PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 76, 
96; DEMICHELE, supra note 126, at 28. 
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comprehensive review of probation in California.132  When it 
issued its Final Report in 2003, the Task Force set out seventeen 
recommendations to improve the unacceptable “status quo.”133  
These recommendations included the provision of stable and 
adequate funding; more centralized governance of probation; the 
development of measurable goals and objectives; the adoption of 
risk/needs assessments and meaningful program evaluations; 
creating a graduated continuum of services and sanctions, 
especially for adults; and greater collaboration among courts, 
counties, and other community agencies.134 
Nothing immediately resulted from the Task Force report.  
In 2007, as the prison overcrowding crisis came to a head, the 
Little Hoover Commission published a report titled “Solving 
California’s Corrections Crisis,” subtitled “Time is Running 
Out.”135  Although the Little Hoover Commission evaluated the 
whole corrections structure, it in particular recommended 
“reallocating resources [from state prison] to community based 
alternatives,”136 and “assist[ing] counties in expanding intensive 
probation,”137 as well as implementing evidence-based practices 
and a “continuum of alternatives to prison.”138  Various witnesses 
told the Commission that California should re-establish 
something like the original Probation Subsidy Act.139 
Finally, in 2009, as the Legislature was drafting S.B. 678, 
the Legislative Analyst’s Office published a report on probation, 
“Achieving Better Outcomes for Adult Probation.”140  The LAO 
identified a set of best practices for probation, including the use 
of risk and needs assessments, program reviews and evaluations 
based on data collection, referral to treatment and assistance 
services, a reduction in probation officers’ caseloads, and a 
system of graduated sanctions to combat the cycle of criminal 
activity buildup followed by revocation.141  Ultimately, the LAO 
settled on recommending an incentive-based funding program for 
probation,142 not unlike the one recently implemented in Arizona. 
 
 132 See generally PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16. 
 133 Id. at 61–98. 
 134 Id. 
 135 See generally LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, supra note 84. 
 136 Id. at iii. 
 137 Id. at vi. 
 138 Id. at 31. 
 139 Id. at 28. 
 140 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 6–29. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 29. 
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C. Legislative Initiatives in Other States 
California is not the only state to experience a problematic 
rise in its prison population and a concomitant rise in 
probationers.  A small number of other states—Kansas and 
Arizona, in particular—have implemented experimental 
legislation in an attempt to reduce probationers’ recidivism.143  
S.B. 678 is not identical to any of these initiatives, but it does 
adopt certain aspects of their provisions.144  Although these 
states have different probation systems than California, it is 
worthwhile to examine their initiatives to better understand the 
policy choices California has made. 
Kansas and Arizona have each passed formal legislation 
addressing probation reform, Kansas in 2007 and Arizona in 
2008.145  Both states articulated similar overall goals for the 
legislation, including increasing public safety, increasing services 
for probationers, and, ultimately, reducing the rate of probation 
revocation.146  Also, both states were concerned with their rising 
prison populations and crime rates.147  Although their goals were 
the same, the states’ approaches did differ in significant respects. 
Kansas’ S.B. 14, also known as the Community Corrections 
Statewide Risk Reduction Initiative (RRI), set up a competitive 
grant application system for counties and established a statewide 
goal of reducing each probation agency’s revocation rate by 
 
 143 Other states, such as Hawaii, have reformed probation through innovative 
programming rather than legislation. See infra Part IV.A (briefly discussing Hawaii’s 
Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE) program). 
 144 See infra Part IV.A. 
 145 Kansas S.B. 14, codified as KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-52,112 (West 2007 & Supp. 
2009); Arizona S.B. 1476, codified as ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-267, 12-270, 13-924 
(West 2003 & Supp. 2009). 
 146 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-112(a), (b); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-267(A)(2)(e), 12-
270(A) (Supp. 2009).  See generally S.B. 1476, 2008 48th Leg., 2nd Sess., § 7 (Ariz. 2008) 
(House Engrossed Senate Bill), available at http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/48leg/2r/bills/ 
sb1476p.pdf. 
 147 Ariz. S.B. 1476, at § 7 (“1. Arizona’s prison population is unacceptably high and 
among the highest in the nation.  2. Arizona’s prison population is expected to increase by 
fifty per cent from 2007 to 2017 . . . .”);; PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, WORK  
IN THE STATES: SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS IN KANSAS 1 (2008), 
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/Kansas(1).pdf (noting that the 
Kansas “Sentencing Commission projected in 2006 that the prison population would grow 
26 percent over the next 10 years, costing taxpayers an additional $500 million”).  In fact, 
Kan. S.B. 14 introduced sweeping reform of the entire correctional system, including an 
increase in good-time credit awarded to state prison inmates for completion of programs, 
and a comprehensive review of Kansas’ sentencing policies. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH 
DEP’T, THIRD CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT BRIEF HOUSE SUBSTITUTE FOR SENATE 
BILL NO. 14, at 1-14 (2007), available at http://www.kslegislature.org/supplemental/ 
2008/CCRB14.pdf. 
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twenty percent using a FY 2006 baseline.148  Under the RRI, 
probation agencies (called “community corrections” in Kansas) 
submit grant proposals to the Department of Corrections which 
then distributes funds to community corrections agencies based 
on plans that accord with the RRI’s stated requirements.149  In 
particular, the RRI requires the adoption of risk assessment 
instruments, provision of evidence-based treatment and services, 
and ongoing data tracking and evaluation of set goals.150  
Significantly, the grants are tied to outcomes: the Department of 
Corrections continues to fund programs only if they are meeting 
their established goals.151 
Rather than set a statewide revocation reduction goal, 
Arizona’s S.B. 1476, the Safe Communities Act, creates an 
incentive-based funding initiative for county probation 
departments whereby probation receives a portion of the money 
saved by the state prison system when probationers remain in 
the community.152  Annually, the Joint Legislative Budget 
Committee calculates for each county the costs avoided by the 
Department of Corrections that may be attributed to reducing 
the county’s rate of revocation.153  This is accomplished by 
comparing the number of revocations to state prison in each 
county with a county-specific baseline revocation rate established 
in 2007–2008; the Budget Committee does the same for the 
number of probationers with new felony convictions.154  As long 
as the number of revocations and new convictions are decreasing 
compared with its baseline rates, each county will receive forty 
percent of the cost savings, to be spent on substance abuse 
treatment, risk reduction programs, and victim services.155  This 
provides a source of funding for probation departments that is 
directly tied to their ability to reduce revocations and improve 
services; at the same time, it insures a cost-savings for the state 
since sixty percent of total cost savings remain unallocated. 
 
 148 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-52,112(a); The Senate Bill 14 Risk Reduction Initiative, KAN. 
DEP’T OF CORR., http://www.doc.ks.gov/publications/the-senate-bill-14-risk-reduction-
initiative (last visited Oct. 18, 2010). 
 149 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-52,112(a), (b). 
 150 § 75-52,112(b). 
 151 § 75-52,112(d) (“The department of corrections shall evaluate the programs which 
received a grant using a research-based process evaluation targeting the critical 
components of effective programs to ensure that the program is being delivered as such 
program was designed.  Continued funding shall be contingent on the program meeting 
the established goals.”). 
 152 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-270(A)(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009). 
 153 § 12-270(A)(1). 
 154 §§ 12-270(A)(1) and (2). 
 155 §§ 12-270(B), 12-267(A)(2)(e). 
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In addition to providing a steady stream of funding for 
outcomes-improving probation departments, the Arizona Safe 
Communities Act also provides “earned time credit” for 
probationers for their good behavior.156  On the recommendation 
of an adult probation officer, a judge may reduce a probationer’s 
term of supervision by twenty days for every month in which the 
probationer “1) [e]xhibits positive progression toward the goals 
and treatment of the probationer’s case plan, 2) [i]s current on 
payments for court ordered restitution . . . , or 3) [i]s current in 
completing community restitution.”157  The earned-time credit 
provision creates a positive incentive for probationers to engage 
with services such as treatment and education, to interact with 
their probation officers, and to fulfill their other obligations.  The 
goal, of course, is both to improve offenders’ chances of success on 
probation and to successfully graduate more probationers from 
their sentences. 
Although Arizona’s statute is arguably more innovative than 
Kansas’, particularly with regard to its sharing of cost-savings, 
Kansas’ RRI does place more emphasis on developing the kinds of 
meticulously planned programs that are shown to work well at 
reducing recidivism, including evidence-based practices, 
probation staff training, treatment services, education and 
employment training, data collection, and careful evaluation.158  
Regardless of the differences, both initiatives have shown early 
promise, although the real funds for Arizona’s program will not 
be distributed until 2010–2011.159  According to the Kansas 
Department of Corrections (KDOC), programs which received the 
RRI grants achieved the twenty percent revocation reduction 
goal within one year and exceeded it within two years.160  
Between 2006 and 2008, Kansas reported a statewide decrease in 
revocations to prison of 21.9%.161  It simultaneously experienced 
a 26.2% increase in probationers successfully completing their 
probation terms.162  Each community corrections agency 
 
 156 § 13-924(A). 
 157 § 13-924(B).  Certain offenders are not eligible for earned time credit, including 
those on probation for more serious felony offenses or misdemeanor offenses, those on 
lifetime probation, and sex offenders. § 13-924(C).  In other words, earned time credit is 
not available for probationers with the highest and the lowest risk of re-offenses. 
 158 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-52,112 (West 2007 & Supp. 2009). 
 159 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-270(B). 
 160 Statement at Justice Reinvestment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, 
Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations, 110th Cong. 4 (2009), available at 
www.justicereinvestment.org/files/Kansas.Werhotlz.pdf (statement of Roger Werholtz, 
Secretary of the Kansas Department of Corrections). 
 161 KAN. DEP’T OF CORR., STATEWIDE COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS RISK INITIATIVE 
ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2009), available at http://www.doc.ks.gov/publications/the-senate-bill-
14-risk-reduction-initiative/SB_14_Risk_Reduction_Initiative_Report_2009.pdf/. 
 162 Id. 
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submitted a detailed RRI plan to the KDOC, which included a 
succinct goal and program data.163  In the first two years, the 
KDOC engaged in extensive risk reduction education and skills 
development for community corrections staff and helped agencies 
develop evidence-based practices individualized to their targeted 
populations.164  Arizona, meanwhile, also exhibits positive trends, 
including a one-year thirteen percent decrease in revocation to 
jails or prison,165 and a 1.9% decrease in probationers’ new felony 
convictions.166  If these positive trends can be attributed to the 
Safe Communities Act—and in fact the report does not chart any 
definite linkage—then results must flow from the earned-time 
credit, since the incentive-based funding does not begin until 
2010–2011.167 
Although Arizona and Kansas each have very different 
probation systems than California, the early success of these 
legislative attempts to reform probation provides an optimistic 
outlook for California’s new initiative. 
 
III.  CALIFORNIA S.B. 678, THE COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 
PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES ACT 
For more than a decade, those familiar with California’s 
probation system grew increasingly critical of the system’s  
inability to handle the rising numbers of adult felony 
probationers sentenced to the community.  Finally, in 2009, the 
Legislature heeded their warnings and drafted a bill which 
declared that “[a]dult probation is a ticking time bomb waiting to 
go off.”168  The Senate Committee on Public Safety acknowledged 
that “[t]he state has been overlooking probation as an essential 
partner in community corrections,”169 and noted that “because 
probation is so sorely under-resourced very little can be done to 
stop [felony probationers’] cycle of offending.”170  However, this 
official recognition of the need to reform adult probation arrived 
only as the result of an extraordinary moment of crisis in 
California’s justice system, and after careful political 
 
 163 Id. at 15–96. 
 164 Id. at 2–11. 
 165 ARIZ. ADULT PROB., PROBATION REVOCATION & CRIME REDUCTION REPORT FY 
2009, at 7 (2009), available at http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/25/SafeCommunitiesAct/ 
FINAL_SB_1476_RPT_FY09.pdf. 
 166 Id. at 10. 
 167 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-270(B) (West 2009). 
 168 Bill Analysis, Hearing on S.B. 678 Before the Assem. Comm. on Public Safety, 
2009–2010 Sess. 13 (Cal. June 16, 2009) [hereinafter Bill Analysis, June]. 
 169 Id. at 14. 
 170 Id. at 13. 
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maneuvering on the part of probation supporters.  The resulting 
statute, the Community Corrections Performance Incentives Act, 
is a hybrid of the Arizona and Kansas acts and includes many of 
the expert recommendations described in Part II of this article. 
A. The Perfect Political Storm 
The Chief Probation Officers of California (CPOC), the 
statewide association of California probation officers which 
became the primary sponsor of S.B. 678, worked for several years 
prior to the bill’s passage to educate members of the government 
regarding the need for funds for adult probation.171  Beginning in 
the mid-1990s, the Legislature began to approve various grants 
and funding sources for juvenile probation which successfully 
reduced the number of juveniles in state institutions.172  One 
initiative was the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act, passed 
in 2001, which provided a steady source of funding to counties for 
programs targeting at-risk youth and young offenders.173  The 
rate of juvenile incarceration dropped by seventy percent 
between 1994 and 2004.174  According to Jerry Powers, CPOC 
Legislative Chair, this preventative partnership between the 
state and counties demonstrated that “if you put money in on the 
front end, you save money on the back end, so everyone saves 
money.”175  Given the success of the juvenile initiatives, those in 
probation began to work toward something similar for adult 
services.176 
CPOC Executive Director Karen Pank, who had recently left 
Governor Schwarzenegger’s office, helped the association put 
together a strategic plan to bring attention to the issue and 
suggested that they make a pitch appealing to the governor’s 
public safety platform: “We knew we had this looming prison 
crisis, so what better way than to be proactive . . . .”177  Governor 
Schwarzenegger, who had vowed to reform California’s 
 
 171 Telephone interview with Karen Pank, supra note 66; telephone interview with 
Jerry Powers, supra note 87. 
 172 For a summary of these grants and initiatives, see generally SUSAN TURNER & 
TERRY FAIN, RAND, ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN JUVENILE PROBATION IN CALIFORNIA OVER THE 
LAST DECADE (2005), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2005/ 
RAND_TR297.pdf. 
 173 See id. at xiii. 
 174 Id.  In 2007, Governor Schwarzenegger signed the Juvenile Justice Realignment 
Act, which furthered the transition from state incarceration to local supervision of 
juvenile offenders. Petersilia, A Retrospective View of Corrections Reform in the 
Schwarzenegger Administration, supra note 9, at 151. 
 175 Telephone interview with Jerry Powers, supra note 87. 
 176 Telephone interview with Karen Pank, supra note 66; telephone interview with 
Jerry Powers, supra note 87. 
 177 Telephone interview with Karen Pank, supra note 66. 
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correctional system early in his tenure,178 liked the idea so much 
he proposed $100 million in funds for adult probation as part of 
the 2007–2008 budget.179  But the budget line did not get past the 
Legislature where prison overcrowding had not yet reached the 
boiling point. 
The prison and budget crises did, however, help coalesce 
CPOC’s attempts to educate legislators regarding the need to 
fund adult probation.  In 2007, CPOC became an intervener in 
Plata v. Schwarzenegger, one of the federal lawsuits addressing 
overcrowding in California’s prisons.180  The association joined 
the lawsuit to argue that California ought to invest in probation 
in order to prevent offenders from being sent to prison in the first 
place.181  Mr. Powers, the Chief Probation Officer for Stanislaus 
County, offered testimony before the federal three-judge panel, 
and later at a joint-legislative hearing, regarding the potential 
release of inmates ordered by the suit.  “I told them I was 
opposed to the release,” Mr. Powers said.182  “You could do the 
same thing [i.e., decrease the prison population] in a much safer 
manner by slowing down the flow to prison in the first place.”183  
CPOC’s arguments interested staff members of the Senate 
Committee on Public Safety, who in late 2008 had learned about 
the new Arizona Safe Communities Act as well as a recent Pew 
Center report encouraging states to draft similar performance-
incentive acts for community corrections.184  Senator Mark Leno, 
the Chair of the Senate Committee on Public Safety, reached out 
to CPOC regarding the possibility of addressing the prison crisis 
through probation.185 
Two factors in particular influenced the drafting of the 
legislation: California’s fiscal crisis and Sacramento’s notoriously 
unforgiving politics.  The fiscal crisis combined with the prison 
overcrowding crisis to create an extraordinary moment in 
California politics—what Senator Leno termed “the perfect 
 
 178 Petersilia, A Retrospective View of Corrections Reform in the Schwarzenegger 
Administration, supra note 9, at 148. 
 179 Telephone interview with Jerry Powers, supra note 87. 
 180 Telephone interview with Karen Pank, supra note 66; telephone interview with 
Jerry Powers, supra note 87. 
 181 Telephone interview with Jerry Powers, supra note 87. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Telephone interview with Alison Anderson, Chief Counsel, California Senate 
Committee on Public Safety (May 10, 2010); PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PUBLIC SAFETY 
PERFORMANCE PROJECT: POLICY FRAMEWORK TO STRENGTHEN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 
1 (2008), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/Policy%20 
Framework.pdf. 
 185 Telephone interview with Karen Pank, supra note 66. 
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storm”186—in which criminal justice reformers were able to break 
through the state’s otherwise “nearly impassable political 
barriers . . . .”187  The three-judge panel had ordered the release 
of inmates;188 the Legislature needed to cut spending.  Reducing 
the prison population was therefore an immediate goal, and 
improving probation a way to do it.  But, the lack of funds meant 
that money for adult probation could not be provided in the way 
that the Legislature had previously funded juvenile probation—
with state grants and budget items.189  Alison Anderson, the 
Chief Counsel for the Senate Committee on Public Safety, had 
worked on public safety since 1994 and saw potential in Arizona’s 
funding incentives model.190  “We’re upside-down in how we 
invest some of our public safety dollars,” Ms. Anderson said.191  
She began to think that “maybe there’s a way we can share state 
savings with locals.”192  Arizona’s funding incentives model is 
better suited to hard economic times than Kansas’ grant-based 
approach because it requires no state funding without 
concomitant savings.  However, while the double-crisis did create 
a window of opportunity, Sacramento politics remained a 
formidable barrier to the passage of any reform effort.  Senator 
Leno is a high-profile Democrat,193 and Ms. Pank felt that a 
bipartisan approach would be necessary to give the bill any 
chance of success.194  Before drafting began, the idea was pitched 
to former Senator John Benoit, a Republican, as a way to 
increase public safety while decreasing the prison population.195  
Senator Benoit agreed to become the co-author of the bill with 
Senator Leno.196  With a bipartisan pact in place, Ms. Anderson 
began drafting a bill that would provide funding for adult 
probation.197 
The resulting legislation, The Community Corrections 
Performance Incentives Act (CCPIA), introduced as S.B. 678, is 
 
 186 Mark Leno, Reforming Corrections: We’ve Only Just Begun, CAP. WKLY., Nov. 30, 
2009, at A11, available at http://dist03.casen.govoffice.com/. 
 187 Id. 
 188 See Opinion and Order, at 183, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 
LKK JFM P (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009). 
 189 Telephone interview with Alison Anderson, supra note 184. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Telephone interview with Karen Pank, supra note 66. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Telephone interview with Alison Anderson, supra note 184. 
 196 Telephone interview with Karen Pank, supra note 66; Telephone interview with 
Jerry Powers, supra note 87; Telephone interview with Alison Anderson, supra note 184. 
 197 Telephone interview with Alison Anderson, supra note 184. 
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“specifically designed to pay for itself”198 while simultaneously 
providing stable funding for adult felony probation, and thus 
promising economic viability.199  The CCPIA incorporates 
recommendations made by the Pew Center report, the LAO 
report, the Probation Services Task Force, and the findings in 
2007 of the Little Hoover Commission.200  As a result, the CCPIA 
is an amalgamation of Arizona’s incentive-based model and the 
evidence-based emphasis of Kansas’ results-driven act. 
B. The Three-Step Funding Formula 
The CCPIA specifically targets adult felony probationers.  As 
in Arizona, the CCPIA sets up a formula by which county 
probation departments receive annual funds from the state 
commensurate with each county’s success in preventing 
probationers from being sent to state prison.201  The formula 
involves three steps.  In the first step, a cooperative of several 
statewide agencies and organizations202 calculates for each 
county its annual probation revocation rate as well as the annual 
statewide probation revocation rate.203  The counties are then 
placed into two tiers: those with failure rates that are no more 
than twenty-five percent higher than the statewide failure rate 
(Tier 1), and those with failure rates that are more than twenty-
five percent above the statewide rate (Tier 2).204 
In the second step, the annual county revocation rate is 
compared to a baseline revocation rate, and calculated for each 
county using 2006–2008 data,205 in order to arrive at a yearly 
estimate of the number of probationers each county successfully 
prevented from revocation to prison.206  Tier 1 counties will 
receive funds equal to forty-five percent of the costs that the 
 
 198 Press Release, Mark Leno, Leno-Benoit Plan to Reduce Prison Population Clears 
Major Hurdle (June 16, 2009) [hereinafter Press Release, Mark Leno], available at  
http://dist03.casen.govoffice.com/index.asp?Type=B_PR&SEC={F0DFD1A5-1C7B-4F09-
9F09-C48A423D1072}&DE={946E1572-5079-4AEE-BF04-9DEBF1A4FDED}. 
 199 See Bill Analysis: Hearing on S.B. 678 Before the S. Comm. on Public Safety, 
2009–2010 Sess. H (Cal. Apr. 28, 2009) [hereinafter Bill Analysis, April], available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_0651-0700/sb_678_cfa_20090427_164719_ 
sen_comm.html. 
 200 See generally Bill Analysis, April, supra note 199; Bill Analysis, June, supra note 
168. 
 201 Bill Analysis, April, supra note 199, at 13. 
 202 These include the California Director of Finance, CDCR, CPOC, the 
Administrative Office of the Courts, and the Joint Legislative Budget Committee. CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 1233.1 (2010). 
 203 §§ 1233.1(b), (c). 
 204 § 1233.2. 
 205 § 1233(a). 
 206 § 1233.1(d).  The number of felony probationers revoked to prison is inclusive of 
those sent for conviction of a new felony offense as well as those revoked for other 
violations. §§ 1233.1(d), (e). 
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CDCR avoided for that county as a result of not having to 
incarcerate those probationers.207  This is calculated by 
multiplying the number of probationers successfully prevented 
from revocation by forty-five percent of the annual cost to 
incarcerate in prison and supervise on parole a failed 
probationer.208  The Tier 2 counties will receive forty percent of 
costs avoided.209 
 
Tier1: Higher Performing Counties 
# Probationers Prevented from Revocation to Prison x .45(annual 
incarceration cost for 1 revoked probationer) 
Tier 2: Lower Performing Counties 
# Probationers Prevented from Revocation to Prison x .4(annual 
incarceration cost for 1 revoked probationer) 
 
Thus, counties with higher success rates (Tier 1) will receive 
a larger portion of costs avoided attributed to their success, 
although the exact dollar amount will be dependent upon the 
number of probationers prevented from revocation.  This means 
that larger counties with smaller success rates might still receive 
more funding than small but highly successful counties. 
The third step is meant to reward the state’s highest 
performing counties, all of which will be in Tier 1.  Counties with 
revocation rates more than fifty percent below the statewide 
revocation rate can choose between receiving the Tier 1 
calculation and a “high performance grant.”210  Annually, the 
state will calculate five percent of total savings to the state 
attributed to all counties’ successful reduction of revocations that 
year.211  Each county opting for a high performance grant will 
receive a share of the five percent calculation based on the 
county’s total population (not just probationers) of eighteen to 
twenty-five year-olds.212 
Ms. Anderson explained that the high performance grants, 
which do not appear in the Arizona bill, are intended to ensure 
adequate recognition of counties that are already high-
performing.213  To understand how the high performance grant 
 
 207 § 1233.3(a). 
 208 § 1233.3(a). 
 209 § 1233.3(b). 
 210 § 1233.4(e). 
 211 § 1233.4(b). 
 212 § 1233.4. 
 213 Telephone interview with Alison Anderson, supra note 184. 
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might benefit a county, contrast Contra Costa County and Los 
Angeles County.  From 2005–2007, Contra Costa County had an 
average revocation rate of one percent, placing it well below the 
statewide average of 7.5%.214  Los Angeles County, in contrast, 
had a 10.7% average revocation rate, placing it in Tier 2.215  
However, Los Angeles County has a total population of adult 
felony probationers more than eighteen times the size of Contra 
Costa’s.216  So, even though Contra Costa will be Tier 1, the 
number of Contra Costa probationers prevented from revocation 
might be much smaller than Los Angeles County’s, and the funds 
it receives from the Tier 1 calculation smaller than Los Angeles 
County’s Tier 2 calculation.  But, Contra Costa’s total eighteen to 
twenty-five year-old population is large—about 124,000.217  
Contra Costa would therefore receive a fairly large amount of the 
high performance grant if it opted to do so, and this would 
potentially amount to more money than the Tier 1 calculation 
would otherwise provide. 
This three-step formula aims to realign the fiscal 
relationship between the state and county probation 
departments, and, in the process, realign the adverse incentives 
formerly in place.  The CCPIA encourages counties to supervise 
offenders in the community, rather than pass the buck to the 
state—the lower a county’s failure rate, the more state funds it 
will receive.  The formula is good for the state as well since it 
saves a portion of the money that it would otherwise spend on 
incarcerating probationers.  The Assembly Appropriations 
Committee projects annual General Fund savings of tens of 
millions of dollars, with savings of $30 million projected for 
2009–2010.218  The Department of Finance projected that if half 
of the roughly twenty thousand felony probationers revoked to 
prison instead remained in the community—an ambitious 
estimate—annual savings for the state would be as high as 
$255 million, while counties could receive up to $127.3 million.219 
 
 214 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 30–31.  See supra note 19 for an 
evaluation of the accuracy of these revocation rates. 
 215 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 30–31. 
 216 Id.  Los Angeles County has 54,285 adult felony probationers, while Contra Costa 
has 3,039. Id. 
 217 CAL. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, REQUEST FOR APPLICATION FOR THE EVIDENCE-
BASED PROBATION SUPERVISION PROGRAM 2 (2009), available at http://www.calema.ca.gov/ 
WebPage/oeswebsite.nsf/OESLevsPDF/2009%20Evidence-Based%20Probation% 
20Supervision%20Program/$file/EBPSP09%20RFA.pdf. 
 218 Bill Analysis: Hearing on S.B. 678 Before the S. Rules Comm., 2009–2010 Sess. 
Fiscal Effect (Cal. Sept. 11, 2009) [hereinafter Bill Analysis, September]. 
 219 Bill Analysis: Hearing on S.B. 678 Before the Cal. Dep’t of Finance, 2009–2010 
Sess. (Cal. Aug. 24, 2009) [hereinafter Bill Analysis, August], available at 
http://www.dof.ca.gov/legislative_analyses/search.php.  
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C. Evidence-Based Programs and Practices 
In addition to creating a complex but strategic funding 
formula, the CCPIA stipulates that county probation 
departments must spend these funds on “evidence-based 
community corrections practices and programs”220 for adult 
felony probationers.  In particular, the CCPIA recommends 
implementing and expanding the use of risk and needs 
assessments to evaluate what level of supervision and which 
programs each offender requires.221  It also suggests the use of 
intermediate sanctions such as electronic monitoring, mandatory 
community service, “restorative justice programs,” and 
incarceration in county jail; “providing more intense probation 
supervision;” and expanding the availability of evidence-based 
programs and rehabilitation for substance abuse, mental health, 
cognitive behavior, and employment training.222 
While the California Department of Finance and the 
Administrative Office of the Courts calculate and disburse the 
annual funds, county probation departments retain control of 
designing and implementing the evidence-based programs as 
they see fit.  Pursuant to the CCPIA, probation must set up an 
advisory committee, called the Community Corrections 
Partnership, to advise in development and implementation of 
evidence-based practices.223  The Community Corrections 
Partnership is mandated to include a range of public safety 
stakeholders, such as the presiding judge of the superior court, 
the district attorney and public defender, the sheriff and chief of 
police, representatives of county social services, mental health, 
education, and employment, and a representative of victims.224  
Thus, the CCPIA encourages the kind of community participation 
and cooperation demonstrated to be an essential part of the 
successful implementation of community corrections programs. 
Finally, and critically both for the proper functioning of the 
funding formula as well as for the successful implementation of 
evidence-based practices, the CCPIA requires probation 
departments to identify and track data and “outcome-based 
measures.”225  This includes basic data such as the number of 
adults on felony probation, the number of revocations to state 
prison, the number of probationers successfully completing their 
terms, the percentage of state moneys expended on evidence-
 
 220 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1230(b)(3) (2010). 
 221 § 1230(b)(3)(A). 
 222 §§ 1230(b)(3)(B)–(D). 
 223 § 1230(b)(1). 
 224 §§ 1230(b)(1), 1230(b)(2)(A)–(M). 
 225 § 1231(a). 
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based programs, and the percentage of offenders supervised in 
accordance with evidence-based practices.226  In order to facilitate 
the accurate collection of data for the bill,227 the Legislature 
passed a companion bill, S.B. 431, which requires an adult 
probationer’s county of residence to facilitate the offender’s 
supervision.228  This remedies the former practice whereby 
probationers could be placed on probation in a county other than 
where they resided, which created situations of duplicate 
supervision or no supervision at all.229 
Significantly, the CCPIA requires that counties reserve five 
percent of funds to evaluate the effectiveness of their programs 
and practices,230 thereby encouraging reliance on evidence and 
outcome-based measures not only to implement programs, but 
also to determine whether such programs are delivering the 
desired outcomes.  The bill also builds in some degree of state 
oversight.  Annually, probation departments must submit a 
written report to the Administrative Office of the Courts and 
CDCR evaluating the effectiveness of their programs.231  In turn, 
the state agencies disbursing the funds must annually report to 
the Governor and Legislature regarding statewide performance-
based outcomes stemming from the CCPIA and “[t]he impact of 
the moneys . . . to enhance public safety . . . .”232 
In theory, therefore, the CCPIA incorporates many of the 
best practices and recommendations of the various reports which 
have addressed probation in California.  In particular, it 
encourages a combination of surveillance and treatment for 
probationers, the use of evidence-based risk and needs 
assessment tools and practices, with critical evaluation of 
program efficacy, and coordination and cooperation with the 
community.  It also seeks to address two of the problems inherent 
in California’s decentralized probation model: lack of state 
oversight and failure to collect data.  Although the CCPIA retains 
California’s county-based probation system, it does require 
greater cooperation between state agencies and local entities as 
far as data collection and funds disbursement.  Ideally, this 
would enable the state to monitor the overall effectiveness of the 
programs and require some level of accountability from counties 
without meddling too much in local affairs.  Ultimately, the 
 
 226 §§ 1231(b)(1)–(4), 1231(d)(1)–(4). 
 227 Telephone interview with Alison Anderson, supra note 184. 
 228 § 1203.9. 
 229 Press Release, Mark Leno, supra note 198. 
 230 § 1230(b)(4). 
 231 Bill Analysis, April, supra note 199, at F–G. 
 232 § 1232. 
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CCPIA represents a shift in perspective on adult probation: “For 
a long time, adult probation was not seen as something that has 
outcomes,” said Natalie Pearl, Research Director for San Diego 
County Probation.233  “This bill is one of the first opportunities 
we’ve had to get funding for adult services.”234 
D. Focus on Public Safety and Startup Funds 
While the CCPIA creates a new financial structure, it is 
worthwhile to consider what the Act does not implement.235  
First, the CCPIA does not alter the existing sentencing structure.  
No crimes are re-categorized as requiring probation rather than 
incarceration.  Second, the CCPIA does not adopt Arizona’s 
approach and thus does not provide probationers with the 
possibility of shortening their sentences with earned-time credit.  
Third, the CCPIA does not shift responsibility for probation to 
the state: probation remains a local public safety program 
receiving some state funds.  And fourth, the CCPIA does not 
itself provide startup funding for evidence-based programs. 
Although the CCPIA does align with many policy-based 
arguments, politics influenced what drafters ultimately decided 
to include in the bill.  Ms. Pank said that creating an earned-
time-credit provision or including any sentencing reform were 
politically infeasible options.236  Sentencing reform, in particular, 
is a dead issue in Sacramento.  Since 1984, seven attempts to 
create a statewide sentencing commission to evaluate and reform 
California’s penal code have failed due to political opposition.237  
In addition, CPOC and county probation departments did not 
wish to cede control over probation to the state; and the CDCR 
certainly did not have the political desire or capacity to assume 
responsibility for even more offenders.238  According to Ms. Pank: 
We were very clear that this was a delicate balance.  We needed to 
juxtapose this solution [to the prison crisis] with all the other 
proposed solutions.  We needed to show that this is not changing 
sentencing; this is not a realignment of county programs to the 
state . . . .  If we had done anything that looked like a sentencing 
 
 233 Telephone interview with Natalie Pearl, Research Director, San Diego County 
Probation (May 12, 2010). 
 234 Id. 
 235 See generally Bill Analysis, April, supra note 199. 
 236 Telephone interview with Karen Pank, supra note 66. 
 237 Lauren E. Geissler, Creating and Passing a Successful Prison Reform Commission 
in California 14 (Stanford Criminal Justice Ctr., Working Paper, 2006), available at 
www.law.stanford.edu/program/centers/scjc/workingpapers/LGeissler_06.pdf. 
 238 Telephone interview with Karen Pank, supra note 66. 
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change, that would have upset the political balance of this big piece of 
legislation.239 
Aware of the politics at play, those supporting S.B. 678 
strategically emphasized public safety and fiscal outcomes, 
rather than altering sentencing or diverting offenders who would 
normally go to prison.  Ms. Anderson explained that a focus on 
diversion would have undermined efforts to pass the bill: “In 
California, in order to get broad bipartisan support, that as a 
goal was not going to get us where we wanted to go.”240  In the 
Senate, the Committee on Public Safety told legislators that S.B. 
678 would accomplish three goals: (1) reduce crime through 
increased supervision of felony offenders; (2) reduce prison 
overcrowding, “not by early release but by decreasing the 
criminal activity of those already on felony probation;” and 
(3) establish sustainable funding and save money for the state.241  
Notably, rehabilitation, treatment, restorative justice, and 
diversion are not listed among those three reasons.242 
The strategic bipartisan focus on outcomes, combined with a 
crisis situation, worked.  S.B. 678 unanimously passed in the 
Senate and the Assembly in September 2009.243  But, the passage 
of the bill alone, without startup funds, would be problematic.  
The failure of the 1994 Community Based Punishment Act 
communicated an important lesson to the CCPIA’s sponsors.244  
“S.B. 678 is really a great piece of legislation.  It really sets up a 
place to pivot the criminal justice system.  But it wouldn’t work if 
there wasn’t any startup money,” Ms. Pank said.245  Federal 
funding offered a solution: the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 made stimulus funding available to 
states for public safety projects.246  Through the Edward Byrne 
Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program, probation 
departments are eligible for a portion of $44.5 million to jump-
start the implementation of evidence-based programs and 
 
 239 Id. 
 240 Telephone interview with Alison Anderson, supra note 184. 
 241 Bill Analysis, April, supra note 199, at R. 
 242 See id. 
 243 S.B. 678, Legis. Counsel’s Digest (Cal. Sept. 12, 2009), available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_0651-0700/sb_678_bill_20090915_ 
enrolled.pdf. 
 244 See Hearing on S.B. 1069 Before the Assem. Comm. on Public Safety, 1995–1996 
Sess. Current Bill Status (Cal. July 11, 1995) [hereinafter Hearing on S. B. 1069], 
available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/sen/sb_1051-1100/sb_1069_bill_ 
20081204_status.html. 
 245 Telephone interview with Karen Pank, supra note 66. 
 246 For information on the act, see Current Legislation: American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act, SPEAKER NANCY PELOSI, http://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/ 
legislation?id=0273 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010). 
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practices.247  The Legislature approved the one-time federal grant 
funding as part of the 2009–2010 Budget Act, which also 
reserved $424,000 for the Administrative Office of the Courts to 
begin administering the CCPIA.248  With all the pieces thus in 
place, the CCPIA is set to begin reforming the state of adult 
felony probation in California. 
IV.  IMPLEMENTING S.B. 678 
The passage of S.B. 678, while groundbreaking, is just the 
beginning of the efforts to reform adult probation in California.  
California’s own legislative history demonstrates that good 
legislative work comprises only a small fraction of the battle.  
The movement from planning to implementation can, and 
undoubtedly will, pose unforeseen challenges.  Data collection, 
funding administration, the daily actions of probation officers—
all these areas and others open a myriad of potential pitfalls.  
Moreover, probation has limited time to demonstrate the act’s 
efficacy to legislators since the CCPIA sunsets in 2015.249  It is 
therefore useful to take note of those areas which may pose 
particular challenges to implementation.  If implementers 
exercise caution and flexibility, the CCPIA could prove to be a 
long-term success. 
A. A Survey of County Plans 
Beginning in 2010, probation departments will receive the 
one-time JAG stimulus grants distributed over a period of three 
years; the size of the grants, which total $44.5 million, are 
proportionate to each county’s population of adults ages eighteen 
to twenty-five years.250  Counties submitted applications for JAG 
stimulus funds to the California Emergency Management Agency 
(Cal EMA) in late 2009.251 These grant applications, 
accompanying submissions to county supervisor boards, and 
interviews with chief probation officers, provide details of 
probation department plans for the implementation of the 
CCPIA.252  A survey of the grant applications of seven diverse 
 
 247 See CAL. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 217. 
 248 Bill Analysis, September, supra note 218, at 14. 
 249 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1233.8 (2010). 
 250 CAL. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 217, at 2. 
 251 Id. at 1. 
 252 Id. at 21.  According to Cal EMA, the purpose of the grant program “is to provide 
evidence-based supervision, programs, or services to adult felon probationers in an effort 
to reduce the likelihood that they will commit new crimes or other violations and be sent 
to prison.” Id. at cover letter.  Although the Request for Application does not explicitly 
mention the CCPIA, its goals, including collection of relevant data, are consistent with the 
CCPIA; the legislative intent was to provide this grant to counties as startup funding 
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counties, some Tier 1 (Stanislaus, San Diego, San Francisco, 
Tulare), some Tier 2 (Riverside, Shasta, Fresno), some with very 
large adult felony probation populations (San Diego: 21,940; 
Riverside: 13,052) and other smaller (San Francisco: 4,733; 
Shasta: 1,822) gives some indication of the immediate actions 
probation departments are taking to implement evidence-based 
practices.253  The grant applications and other sources show that 
counties are beginning the process of hiring probation officers, 
implementing risk/need assessments, and exploring options for 
increasing evidence-based services and sanctions. 
The Recovery Act requires grant recipients to demonstrate 
that the funding helped retain or create jobs.254  As a result, all 
counties applying for grants plan to hire new probation officers or 
retain others that, due to budget cuts, might have otherwise been 
let go.255  Given the high caseloads across counties,256 the 
retention or addition of probation officers is indeed critical to the 
success of any probation reform; moreover, implementing 
evidence-based practices will likely require more time per 
probationer than previously provided.  For example, Tulare 
County, which will receive a total of $635,044 over three years, 
plans to use ninety-nine percent of grant funds to pay the salary 
and benefits of four new probation officers.257  Tulare, currently 
the sixth most poverty-stricken county in the United States with 
a 14.9% unemployment rate, would not otherwise be able to 
implement evidence-based practices: “Adult offenders in Tulare 
County receive very few specialized services that assist them in 
maintaining a crime-free lifestyle.  Current adult supervision 
probation caseloads average over 100 probationers per officer and 
do not allow for intensive supervision services nor adequate 
assessment of offender needs.”258 
 
until the CCPIA’s incentive-based funding begins to be distributed. See Bill Analysis, 
September, supra note 218, at 16. 
 253 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 30–31.  Calculations of counties’ 
assignments to Tier 1 or Tier 2 are based on the Legislative Analyst’s Office provision of 
revocation rates for 2005–2007, with an average statewide rate of 7.5%.  Counties with 
revocation rates under 9.375 (25% above 7.5) are Tier 1, while those with rates higher 
than 9.375 are Tier 2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1233.2 (2010).  See supra note 19 for an 
evaluation of the accuracy of this data and rate calculations. 
 254 CAL. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 217, at 13. 
 255 Id. 
 256 See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 30–31. 
 257 CAL. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, PROJECT SUMMARY FOR TULARE COUNTY, 
EVIDENCE-BASED PROBATION SUPERVISION PROGRAM BUDGET NARRATIVE 1 (2009), 
available at http://bosagendas.co.tulare.ca.us/MG307139/AS307142/AS307157/AI307312/ 
DO307414/DO_307414.pdf. 
 258 Id. at Project Summary § 8. 
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Lowering caseloads is a goal even for the highest performing 
counties, like San Francisco.259  Wendy Still, the San Francisco 
Chief Adult Probation Officer, said that San Francisco will also 
be adding a probation officer in an ongoing effort to lower 
caseloads to eighty offenders per officer.260  
In addition to adding staff, probation departments which 
formerly did not use risk/needs assessment tools are spending 
JAG funds to purchase and implement these.  For example, Tier 
2 counties Fresno, Riverside, and Shasta each lacked an 
assessment tool prior to 2010.261  Fresno County will use part of 
its $1.3 million grant funding to implement the use of an 
assessment tool to help determine “what interventions would 
best address the offender’s risk of reoffending and thus returning 
to prison.”262  Sparsely populated Shasta County will use a 
portion of its $37,353 grant to participate along with fifteen other 
counties in the development of an assessment tool.263 
Many counties are also planning to expand evidence-based 
services for probationers; a task that is possible only through 
increases in staffing and the use of risk/needs assessment tools.  
San Francisco intends to implement a pilot program targeted at 
felony probationers ages eighteen to twenty-five; and, in addition 
to higher levels of supervision, probationers who fall into this 
category will have increased access to services in four target 
areas: substance abuse, housing, education, and employment.264  
Wendy Still explained that the idea is to show that the program 
works for this target group, and thereafter it will expand 
outward to the rest of the probation population using CCPIA 
funds.265  Since San Francisco will likely fall within the small 
pool of counties eligible for the high performance grants, Ms. Still 
said she will select whichever calculation—Tier 1 or high 
 
 259 Telephone interview with Wendy Still, supra note 65. 
 260 Id. 
 261 See CNTY. OF RIVERSIDE PROB. DEP’T, SUBMITTAL TO THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 2 (2009), available at www.clerkoftheboard.co.riverside.ca.us/ 
agendas/2009/12_22_2009/03.39.pdf; FRESNO CNTY. BD. OF SUPERVISORS, AGENDA ITEM 
38: EVIDENCE BASED PROBATION SUPERVISION PROGRAM WITH THE CALIFORNIA 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (2010) [hereinafter FRESNO CNTY. BD.  
OF SUPERVISORS], available at http://www2.co.fresno.ca.us/0110a/Questys_Agenda/ 
MG173545/AS173576/AS173593/AI173734/DO173735/DO_173735.pdf; SIERRA CNTY. BD. 
OF SUPERVISORS, AGENDA ITEM 4: AUTHORIZATION TO APPLY FOR A RECOVERY JUSTICE 
ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG) THROUGH CALIFORNIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY  
(CAL EMA) (2009) [hereinafter SIERRA CNTY. BD. OF SUPERVISORS], available at 
http://www.sierracounty.ws/county_docs/bos/BOS%20DECEMBER%2015%202009/121520
09%20BOS%20PKT.pdf. 
 262 FRESNO CNTY. BD. OF SUPERVISORS, supra note 261, at 2. 
 263 SIERRA CNTY. BD. OF SUPERVISORS, supra note 261. 
 264 Interview with Wendy Still, supra note 65. 
 265 Id. 
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performance—will provide more money.266  In San Diego, roughly 
$2 million of the county’s $3.4 million in stimulus funding will go 
toward accepting contract bids from community providers of 
direct services.267  Although San Diego is a Tier 1 county with a 
large adult felony probation population, Natalie Pearl said the 
right types of services are not currently available to 
probationers.268  In particular, she said, San Diego will be looking 
for carefully tailored contract proposals for cognitive behavioral 
services, substance abuse treatment, and vocational and 
educational training.269 
Several counties, including Stanislaus, Fresno, and Tulare, 
are intending to combine access to services with increased 
supervision through the creation of targeted day reporting 
centers.270  All three counties will assign probationers to high 
supervision caseloads based on the outcome of assessment tools.  
Stanislaus, for example, is specifying intensive supervision for 
approximately fifty medium-to-high risk eighteen to twenty-five 
year-old felony probationers.271  Day reporting centers place 
probation officers under the same roof as services, allowing a 
one-stop shop for daily interactions with probation officers, drug 
testing, job training, housing assistance, peer support groups, 
and other services.272 
Finally, both San Diego and Stanislaus intend to increase 
probationer accountability through implementing sanction 
models in which offenders receive immediate hearings and 
escalating sanctions for any violations.273  Stanislaus, in addition 
to increasing services through a day reporting center, will 
emulate an evidence-based program in Hawaii called HOPE 
(Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement).274  Through 
the use of unscheduled drug testing and the threat of immediate, 
short-term jail sentences (“flash incarceration”), HOPE has 
demonstrated success in significantly decreasing positive drug 
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 267 Telephone interview with Natalie Pearl, supra note 233. 
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 270 BD. OF SUPERVISORS OF THE CNTY. OF STANISLAUS, ACTION AGENDA SUMMARY, 
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SUPERVISORS, supra note 261. 
 271 BD. OF SUPERVISORS OF THE CNTY. OF STANISLAUS, supra note 270, at 3. 
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 273  Telephone interview with Natalie Pearl, supra note 233; BD. OF SUPERVISORS OF 
THE CNTY. OF STANISLAUS, supra note 271, at 3. 
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tests and lowering arrest rates among probationers.275  Ms. Pearl 
said that San Diego is looking at a similar model used in Houston 
and hopes to create a program tailored to San Diego’s resources 
and needs.276 
B. Potential Challenges for Implementation 
The statewide implementation of the CCPIA is underway 
and so far appears to be conforming to the intent of legislators.  
However, there are already several areas of concern for 
implementation which probation departments and state 
administrations should carefully consider: county budget 
shortfalls; the need for extensive training; and the omission of 
concrete incentives for probationers. 
First, while the CCPIA guarantees some funding from the 
state once the initiative is up and running—that is, once counties 
can show results—but before those results develop, counties 
must depend on the stimulus grants and county funds.  While the 
JAG grants are a positive development, federal funds may not be 
enough to provide the needed startup money.277  Unfortunately, 
the CCPIA asks probation departments to develop greater 
supervision and resources at a time when many counties face 
severe budget cuts.278  For example, Tulare County cut its 
Probation Department’s budget by 6.03% in FY 2009–2010, 
freezing some salaries and instituting a mandatory furlough.279  
Stanislaus intends to implement a “flash incarceration” system, 
but the Sheriff’s Department is closing two hundred fifty beds 
due to budget cuts.280  And, San Francisco Mayor Gavin 
Newsome told agencies, including probation, to submit reports 
anticipating worst-case scenario budget cuts of ten to twenty 
percent.281  Karen Pank said that with all of the budget cuts, “I’m 
concerned that $45 million of start-up funding won’t go as far as 
we had hoped.”282  That would leave probation departments 
without the funds necessary to implement the programs and 
 
 275 ANGELA HAWKEN & MARK KLEIMAN, RESEARCH BRIEF: EVALUATION OF HOPE 
PROBATION (2008) available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/ 
HOPE_Research_Brief.pdf.  See also Mark Schoofs, Scared Straight . . . by Probation, 
WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121685255149978873.html. 
 276 Telephone interview with Natalie Pearl, supra note 233. 
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 279 CAL. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, PROJECT SUMMARY FOR TULARE COUNTY, supra 
note 257, at Project Summary § 8. 
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practices needed to begin fulfilling the CCPIA’s revocation-
reduction objective.283  Moreover, for less populous counties, the 
stimulus grants may not be enough to cover the costs of 
assessment tools and data management systems.284  As a result, 
Ms. Pank said she would not be surprised if some smaller 
counties decide that it is not cost effective for them to partake in 
the CCPIA program at all.285 
Funding issues aside, the mere implementation of evidence-
based practices and programs alone, without ongoing training 
and monitoring of probation officers and staff, will accomplish 
little.  As the National Institute for Corrections admonishes, 
“[i]mplementing evidence-based policy and practice is not a 
simple task; it requires a fundamental change in the way 
community corrections does business, and a shift in the 
philosophies of those doing this work.”286  Turning theory into 
practice can backfire if program components are altered or 
ignored due to political pressure or shoddy training: “Those 
interested in translating the ‘what works’ literature into 
operational programs must make certain that the programs are 
implemented fully and coherently, not dismantled or watered 
down through the political process in ways that undermine their 
effectiveness.”287 
Wendy Still agrees that, even in high-performing San 
Francisco, instituting best practices is slow work which requires 
training.288  “We have a long way to go,” she said.289  “There are 
cultures that have to change within institutions.”290  However, 
the text of the CCPIA does not mention probation staff 
training.291  And while the act requires departments to reserve 
some funds for the evaluation of programs,292 this back-end focus 
misses critical work that must be done at the front end.  The 
California Public Defenders Association, which opposed S.B. 678, 
criticized the bill for “presuppos[ing] that each Probation 
Department is a clinically trained treatment provider.”293  
 
 283 Id. 
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Indeed, in San Diego, Natalie Pearl predicts that the largest 
challenge for implementation of the CCPIA will be insuring that 
all probation officers and staff are properly using the evidence-
based methods: “I see the major challenge as fidelity to the 
evidence based practice knowledge.  I don’t think most of us 
really understand what [constant and careful following of EBP] 
means . . . .  Unless you maintain integrity to that model, it won’t 
reduce recidivism.”294 
As a result, San Diego is taking the training of its officers 
seriously.  As part of the its grant funding, the county will be 
collaborating with the University of California, San Diego to 
provide two days of training per month for its line officers.295  
Although San Diego already uses a risk/needs assessment, Ms. 
Pearl said training will focus on the “needs” half of the 
equation.296  Officers will learn how to better manage cases and 
motivate offenders to change.297  Proper implementation will call 
for a shift in officer attitude from an all-enforcement mentality to 
a mixture of supervision and social work.298  Unless other 
counties likewise devote resources to training, the theory behind 
evidence-based practices will likely fail to produce real outcomes 
when implemented.299 
In addition to failing to mention or build in resources for 
training, the Legislature opted to refrain from including earned-
time credits for probationers who follow court orders and 
participate in programming.  The possibility of shortened 
probation terms for good behavior would provide probationers 
with positive incentives to alter their criminal conduct.  The 
California Public Defenders Association criticized S.B. 678 for 
this omission and suggested that it include incentives for 
probationers “including, but not limited to, reduction in the 
length of probation supervision.”300  Although conceivably the 
CCPIA could reduce revocations without such incentives, this 
situation has not been tested.  Arizona’s early success appears to 
be largely the result of the earned-time credit provision.301  
Moreover, the experience of drug courts and other evidence-based 
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programs indicates that “positive reinforcement for good behavior 
is often critical for producing long-term behavioral 
improvement,” especially for individuals with long histories of 
coercive interactions with the law.302  Of course, judges are 
already enabled by law to reduce probation terms,303 so probation 
departments do not need an act to recommend a term reduction 
to judges.  Wendy Still said San Francisco intends to do just that 
if a probationer is doing well on probation and participating in 
programs.304  In fact, positive incentives need not be limited to a 
reduction in probation time, but could be as simple as positive 
feedback from a figure of authority, such as a judge, or 
recognition at a graduation ceremony, as occurs in drug court.  
That said, positive incentives of this ilk only work if the 
probationer is aware of them ex ante, and they are dependent on 
the involvement of a judge in the oversight of a probationer’s 
case. 
The success of the CCPIA might very well depend on 
probation’s proactive outreach to county judges.  Judges have the 
power not only to decide whether to sentence offenders to 
probation in the first place, but also to determine the conditions 
of probation.305  Judges can set goals for the offender, shorten 
probation terms, and show lenience if an offender violates the 
terms of his probation.306  Judges also have the influence to draw 
together justice system actors such as prosecutors and defenders, 
thus proving an important ally in the creation of community 
cooperation and motivation.  In fact, Little Hoover Commission 
recommended that judges should be empowered to “oversee the 
progress of the offenders in the assigned community 
sanctions.”307  The Public Defender Association likewise agreed 
that “intensive judicial supervision will enhance public safety 
and increase positive outcomes for a great number of [probation 
program] participants.”308  While the CCPIA does include the 
chief judge of the county superior court on the Community 
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Corrections Partnership committee,309 probation departments 
ought to make a concerted effort to obtain buy-in and active 
support for local judges whether or not they decide to provide 
offenders with positive incentives. 
CONCLUSION 
After twenty years of neglect, California’s adult probationers 
are finally receiving the legislative attention this high-risk, high-
needs population desperately needs.  If implemented properly, 
California’s S.B. 678, the Community Corrections Performance 
Incentives Act, could represent a sea-change in how the 
California justice system engages with low-level offenders.  In 
large part, the CCPIA is a well-crafted piece of legislation which 
incorporates expert recommendations and lessons learned from 
failed projects.  By providing sustainable funding tied to 
probation departments’ implementation of evidence-based 
practices, the CCPIA seeks to realign the fiscal relationship 
between counties and the state and to reverse the adverse 
incentive structure which leads counties to incarcerate rather 
than rehabilitate.  So far, counties that have begun to implement 
the CCPIA appear to be adhering to legislative intent; but 
implementation will likely prove difficult.  In order to ensure the 
success of the CCPIA, probation departments should devote 
adequate resources to staff training, provide positive incentives 
for probationers, and reach out to judges and other justice system 
actors.  Furthermore, the state and the counties should demand 
accountability of one another and annual reports evaluating 
outcomes should be read and then acted upon.  Like any long-
term project, the CCPIA will require some short-term investment 
in order to produce benefits down the road. 
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